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Abstract
The primary objective of this paper is to revisit Simpson’s paradox us-
ing a statistical misspecification perspective. It is argued that the reversal
of statistical associations is sometimes spurious, stemming from invalid
probabilistic assumptions imposed on the data. The concept of statistical
misspecification is used to formalize the vague term ‘spurious results’ as
‘statistically untrustworthy’ inference results. This perspective sheds new
light on the paradox by distingusing between statistically trustworthy vs.
untrustworthy association reversals. It turns out that in both cases there
is nothing counterintuitive to explain or account for. This perspective is
also used to revisit the causal ‘resolution’ of the paradox in an attempt
to delineate the modeling and inference issues raised by the statistical
misspecification perspective. The main arguments are illustrated using
both actual and hypothetical data from the literature, including Yule’s
”nonsense-correlations” and the Berkeley admissions study.
KEYWORDS: Association reversal; Spurious correlation; Statistical
misspecification; Statistical vs. substantive adequacy; Misspecification
testing; Untrustworthy evidence; Causality; Confounding.
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1 Introduction
True to ”Stigler’s Law of Eponymy” (Stigler, 1980), Simpson’s paradox has a
long history in statistics going back to Yule’s (1903) ‘spurious’ association, but
it is currently credited to Simpson (1951) for reframing it as a ‘paradox’; see
Blyth (1972).
The paradox seems to have a number of alternative conceptions, and thus,
it is often described interchangeably as a counter-intuitive statistical result per-
taining to:
(a) Statistical associations that reverse themselves, such as ”a marginal asso-
ciation can have a different direction from each conditional association” (Agresti,
2013).
(b) Either the magnitude or the direction of an association between two
variables is influenced by a third variable, such as ”the association between a
pair of variables (X,Y ) reverses sign upon conditioning on a third variable, Z.”
(Pearl, 2014).
(c) Apparent statistical associations that after closer scrutiny of the data are
rendered ‘spurious’ (Yule, 1903).
The recent discussions in statistics have focused on adopting one of the
perspectives (a)-(c), and using actual or hypothetical data to either explain away
the paradox or criticize other proposed ‘solutions’. The current dominating view
revolves around perspective (b) that differs from (a) in so far as it emphasizes
the causal dimension of conditioning on a confounder; see Pearl (2009), Spirtes
et al. (2000). Armistead (2014) put forward a dissenting view by arguing that
perspective (b) is rather narrow to explain the different facets of the paradox:
“Simpson’s Paradox, like all paradoxes, can be defined as an apparent contra-
diction that may contain more than one truth.” (p. 6)
A strong case can be made that Simpson’s paradox has different dimensions
that are often conflated or ignored in the literature. As argued by Wasserman
(2004):
“Simpson’s paradox is a puzzling phenomenon that is discussed in most statis-
tics texts. Unfortunately, most explanations are confusing (and in some cases in-
correct).” (p. 259)
The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the different conceptions of
the paradox by bringing out the similarities and differences between perspectives
(a)-(c). The key is provided by Yule’s idea of ‘spuriousness’ in (c). Beginning
with Yule (1903), the problem of ‘fictitious’ associations and ‘spurious’ correla-
tions was a recurring theme in Yules papers that culminated in Yule (1926) on
”nonsense-correlations”. Although he shed some light on the issues involved, he
did not succeed in establishing a direct link between spurious associations and
invalid probabilistic assumptions for reasons to be discussed in the sequel. The
notion of statistical misspecification can be used to formalize the term ‘spurious’
as ‘statistically untrustworthy’ results, stemming from unreliable inference pro-
cedures. This enables one to delineate between two distinct cases of association
reversal:
Case 1. The reversal is statistically trustworthy due to statistical adequacy.
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Case 2. The reversal is statistically untrustworthy due to statistical misspecifi-
cation.
It turns out that the statistical misspecification perspective suggests that in
both cases there is nothing counterintuitive to explain.
In section 2, we discuss the case where the reversal is statistically trustworthy
due to the fact that the statistical models involved are statistically adequate: the
invoked probabilistic assumptions are valid for the particular data. When this
is not the case, the inference results are likely to be statistically untrustworthy
(spurious). This is discussed in section 3 using two empirical examples that
bring out the distinction between statistical and substantive misspecification.
The statistical misspecification argument is illustrated further in section 4 using
several widely discussed examples of the paradox. In section 5, we revisit the
causal ‘resolution’ of the paradox in an attempt to delineate the modeling and
inference issues raised by the statistical misspecification perspective.
2 Marginal vs. conditional associations
Consider the case of a Linear Regression (LR) model:
yt=β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t+ut,
(ut|X1t=x1t, X2t=x2t)∽NIID(0, σ2u), t∈N,
(1)
where ‘NIID’ stands for ‘Normal, Independent and Identically Distributed’. It
is often insufficiently appreciated that the error assumptions imply a particu-
lar statistical parameterization for the unknown parameters θ:=
(
β0, β1, β2, σ
2
)
in terms of the moments of the observable process {Zt:=(yt,X1t, X2t), t∈N}
underlying data Z0 (see Appendix). Alternatively, one can derive the parame-
terization directly using the joint distribution of the observable random variables
involved: 
 ytX1t
X2t


∽ NIID



 µ1µ2
µ3

 ,

 σ11 σ12 σ13σ12 σ22 σ23
σ13 σ23 σ33



 (2)
In this case, the regression and skedastic functions take the form:
E(yt|X1t=x1t, X2t=x2t)=β0+β1x1t+β2x2t, V ar(yt|X1t=x1t, X2t=x2t)=σ2,
where the parameterizations of θ:=
(
β0, β1, β2, σ
2
)
are (table 1):
β0=µ1−β1µ2−β2µ3, β1= (σ12σ33−σ13σ23)(σ22σ33−σ223) , β2=
(σ13σ22−σ12σ23)
(σ22σ33−σ223) (3)
σ2u =σ11−σ12
(
σ12σ33−σ13σ23
σ22σ33−σ223
)
−σ13
(
σ13σ22−σ12σ23
σ22σ33−σ223
)
=σ11−σ12β1−σ13β2
(4)
These results offer the key to elucidating perspectives (a)-(b) on Simpson’s para-
dox.
Perspective (a) on Simpson’s paradox. The correlation between yt and
X1t
(ρ12=
σ12√
σ11σ22
), is positive (ρ12>0), but the coefficient β1 in (1) is negative
(β1<0).
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Is this reversal of association possible, and under what circum-
stances?
In light of the parameterization of β1 in (3), its numerator is negative when:
[(σ12σ33−σ13σ23) < 0]→
[
σ13σ23
σ33
> σ12
]
Multiplying both terms in the last expression by 1/
√
σ11σ22, yields:
σ13σ23
σ33
√
σ11σ22
=ρ13ρ23 > ρ12=
σ12√
σ11σ22
,
where Corr(Yt , X2t):=ρ13=
σ13√
σ33σ11
and Corr(X1t , X2t):=ρ23=
σ23√
σ22σ33
.
Hence, ρ12>0 and β1<0 occur when the following conditions hold:
(i) the correlation coefficients ρ13 and ρ23 have the same sign,
(ii) the product of ρ13 and ρ23 is greater than ρ12, i.e. ρ13·ρ23>ρ12, and
(iii) the determinant of the correlation matrix of Zt is positive:
Corr(Zt)=1−ρ212−ρ213−ρ223+2ρ12ρ13ρ23>0.
Condition (iii) ensures that f(yt, x1t, x2t;φ) in (2) is proper, giving rise to a
well-defined conditional distribution f(yt|x1t, x2t;ϕ); see Spanos and McGuirk
(2002).
2.1 Example 1. Correlations vs. partial correlations
Assuming σ11=σ22=σ33=1, without any loss of generality, let the relevant cor-
relations be: (ρ12, ρ13, ρ23)= (.5,±.7,±.8) , which satisfy (i)-(iii) above.
(a) For values (ρ13, ρ23)= (.7, .8): β1=− .167, β2=.833, σ2=.5
(b) For values (ρ13, ρ23)= (−.7,−.8): β1=− .167, β2=− .833, σ2=.5
Note that the sign of β2 reflects the common sign of (ρ13, ρ23) . In light of
these results, it is clear that there is nothing paradoxical, or surprising, about the
reversal of sign between the simple correlation ρ12>0 [stemming from the joint
distribution f(yt,x1t;ϕ1)], and the regression coefficient β1<0 [stemming from
the conditional distribution f(yt|x1t, x2t;ϕ2)]. This reversal is due to the con-
ditions (i)-(iii) above, which are easily testable in practice; see Spanos (2006b).
It is well-known that there is a direct connection between ρ12 and the re-
gression coefficient of x1t in the context of the simple linear regression:
yt=α0+α1x1t + εt,
(εt|X1t=x1t)∽NIID(0, σ2ε ), t∈N,
(5)
whose implicit statistical parameterization of φ:=
(
α0, α1, σ
2
1
)
is:
α0=µ1−α1µ2, α1=σ12σ22 , σ2ε=σ11−
σ2
12
σ22
.
This is because ρ12 is a scaled (
√
σ22/
√
σ11)>0) reparameterization of α1:
ρ12=
√
σ22√
σ12
α1. (6)
In the above numerical example, α1=.5 and β1= − .167, confirming the sign
reversal. This implies that one can consider the question of association reversal
by comparing the inference results in (1) and (5).
In conclusion, it is very important to emphasize that in the above ex-
ample, both LR models, (1) and (5), are assumed to be statistically ade-
quate: their probabilistic assumptions are valid. In the case of real data on
(yt,x1t, x2t) , t=1, 2, ..., n, one needs to establish the statistical adequacy of both
models using comprehensive misspecification testing. What are the probabilistic
assumptions that need to hold for data Z0?
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3 Spurious (statistically untrustworthy) results
In this section we bring out more explicitly the probabilistic assumptions com-
prising the Linear Regression (LR) model with a view to illustrate the role of
statistical misspecification in shedding light on the various aspects of Simpson’s
paradox.
3.1 The statistical misspecification perspective
Traditionally, the probabilistic assumptions underlying the Linear Regression
(LR) model are specified in terms of the error term; see Appendix. It turns
out, however, that such specifications are often incomplete and sometimes in-
clude non-testable assumptions. Table 1 specifies the LR, generically defined
by: in terms of the Statistical Generating Mechanism (GM) and assumptions
[1]-[5] that constitute a complete, internally consistent and testable set of as-
sumptions in terms of the observable process {(yt|Xt=xt) , t∈N} underlying
the data Z0:={(yt,xt), t=1, 2, ..., n}. This provides a purely probabilistic con-
strual for the notion of a statistical model, viewed as a particular parameter-
ization of the process {(yt|Xt=xt) , t∈N}. Intuitively, the statistical model
comprises the totality of probabilistic assumptions one imposes on the process
{(yt|Xt=xt) , t∈N} with a view to render data Z0 a ‘typical’ realization thereof.
The ‘typicality’ is testable using thorough misspecification testing; see Spanos
(2006a).
Table 1: Linear Regression Model
Statistical GM: yt=β0 + β
⊤
1 xt + ut, t∈N.
[1] Normality: (yt| Xt=xt) ∽ N(., .),
[2] Linearity: E (yt| Xt=xt)=β0 + β⊤1 xt,
[3] Homoskedasticity: V ar (yt| Xt=xt) =σ2,
[4] Independence: {(yt| Xt=xt) , t∈N} indep. process,
[5] t-invariance:
(
β0, β1, σ
2
)
are not changing with t,
β0=E(yt)−β⊤1 E(Xt), β1=[Cov(Xt)]−1Cov(Xt, yt),
σ2=V ar(yt)−Cov(Xt, yt)⊤[Cov(Xt)]−1Cov(Xt, yt)


t∈N.
Statistical adequacy. An estimated LR model is said to be statistically
adequate when all assumptions [1]-[5] are valid for data Z0. In practice, statis-
tical adequacy can be appraised using comprehensive misspecification testing;
see Spanos (1999, 2015). The importance of establishing statistical adequacy
stems from the fact that it secures the statistical reliability of inference based
on such a model. That is, the inference propositions associated with the LR
model, including the optimal properties of the MLE estimators and the relevant
error probabilities of the t and F tests, are reliable in the sense that their ac-
tual sampling distributions approximate closely the theoretical ones derived by
invoking the validity of assumptions [1]-[5].
Unreliability of inference. When any subset of the assumptions [1]-[5] are
invalid, the reliability of inference of such procedures is called into question. Sta-
tistical misspecifications are likely to give rise to inconsistent estimators as well
as induce sizeable discrepancies between the nominal (assumed) error probabil-
ities and the actual ones in testing. For instance, when any of the assumptions
[2], [4]-[5] are invalid, the OLS estimators of (β0, β1) are likely to be inconsis-
tent, and the nominal error probabilities associated with the significance t-tests
for the coefficients (β0, β1) are likely to have significant discrepancies from the
actual error probabilities; see Spanos and McGuirk (2001), Spanos (2010). Ap-
plying a .05 significance level t-test when the actual type I error is closer to .8
is likely to give rise to unreliable inferences.
It is important to emphasize that for assumptions [4] and [5] to be testable,
one needs to select an ordering of interest for data Z0. In the case of time-
series data, the ordering of interest is invariably ‘time’, which is an interval
scale variable. For cross-section data, however, there are often several orderings
of interest, depending on the individual unit being observed, and the modeler
needs to think about such potential orderings as they relate to [4]-[5]. Potential
orderings for cross-section can vary from gender (nominal scale), to age (ratio
scale), etc.
3.2 Statistical vs. substantive misspecification
Let us return to example 1, where the problem of association reversal can be
viewed in the context of comparing the regression coefficients of x1t, α1 and β1,
in the context of two Linear Regression models:
Model 1: yt=β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t+ut, (ut|Xt=xt)∽NIID(0, σ2u), t∈N,
Model 2: yt=α0+α1x1t + εt, (εt|X1t=x1t)∽NIID(0, σ2ε ), t∈N,
where xt:=(x1t, x2t)
⊤. In the previous section, it was argued that when both
models are statistically adequate, it could happen that the estimated coefficients
α1 and β1 differ in both sign and magnitude. There is, however, a sizeable lit-
erature on ‘omitted variables’ which would call model 2 misspecified when β2
turns out to be statistically significant; see Greene (2011). In what sense is
model 2 misspecified if its assumptions [1]-[5] (table 1) are valid? Similarly, the
literature on causal modeling would test the significance of the covariances σ13
and σ23 as they relate to the regression coefficients, to decide whether x2t is a
confounder; see Pearl (2011). How does this relate to the statistical misspecifi-
cation perspective?
A closer look at the literature suggests that statistical misspecification is
often conflated with substantive misspecification, using confusing and confused
claims, such as the OLS estimator of α1 in model 2 is an inconsistent estimator
of β1 in model 1 (Greene, 2011), ignoring the fact that the two coefficients
represent very different parameterizations: α1=
σ12
σ22
, β1=
(σ12σ33−σ13σ23)
(σ22σ33−σ223)
.
To make any sense of such comparisons, one needs to distinguish between
statistical and substantive adequacy because the former requires only that as-
sumptions [1]-[5] are valid for Z0. Assumptions [1]-[5] have nothing to do with:
the LR model includes all ‘substantively’ relevant variables. The latter is a sub-
stantive assumption that pertains to the explanatory potential of the estimated
model as it relates to the phenomenon of interest. Substantive inadequacy can
arise from missing but relevant variables, false causal claims, etc. The crucial
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importance of this distinction stems from the fact that when models 1-2 are
statistically misspecified, both the test for an omitted variable, as well as the
tests for deciding whether x2t is a confounder, or a mediator, are likely to give
rise to untrustworthy results; see Spanos (2006b).
This distinction is also important when the term ‘spurious’ is employed with-
out being qualified to differentiate between statistically and substantively spu-
rious inference results. Indeed, the term ‘spurious correlation’ is often used to
describe the case where the statistical significance of a correlation coefficient is
taken at face value, and an attempt is made to explain it away using substan-
tive arguments; see Sober (2001). More often than not, however, one can show
that the statistical significance is more apparent than real, because it is just an
untrustworthy result stemming from a statistically misspecified model.
3.3 Example 2. Yule’s ‘nonsense-correlations’
The problem of ‘spurious’ associations, first noted by Pearson (1896), was high
up in Yule’s agenda during the first quarter of the 20th century, returning to it on
several occasions; see Yule (1909, 1910, 1921). Yule (1926) is the culmination of
his efforts to unravel the puzzle of ‘spurious’ results using the high correlations
between time series data as an example. He used data measuring the ratio
of Church of England marriages to all marriages (xt) and the mortality rate
(yt) over the period 1866-1911, to demonstrate that their estimated correlation
ρ̂xy=.9512 was both very high and statistically significant. He described this
result as ‘nonsense-correlation’ because ‘common sense judges to be incorrect.’
(p.4) He went on to reject any attempt, however ingenious, to rationalize such
a statistical result on substantive grounds:
“Now I suppose it is possible, given a little ingenuity and goodwill, to rationalize
very nearly anything. And I can imagine some enthusiast arguing that the fall in the
proportion of Church of England marriages is simply due to the Spread of Scientific
Thinking since 1866, and the fall in mortality is also clearly to be ascribed to the
Progress of Science; hence both variables are largely or mainly influenced by a
common factor and consequently ought to be highly correlated. But most people
would, I think, agree with me that the correlation is simply sheer nonsense; that
it has no meaning whatever; that it is absurd to suppose that the two variables in
question are in any sort of way, however indirect, causally related to one another.”
(p. 2)
Yule (1926) attempted to articulate the premise that ‘nonsense-correlations’
have something to do with the fact that his time series data are not ‘random
series’. He could not establish a clear and direct link between ‘spurious’ associ-
ations and statistical misspecification, however, because he was missing two key
components that were yet to be integrated into statistics. The first is the notion
of a ‘parametric statistical model’, innovated by Fisher (1922), and the second
is the theory of ‘stochastic processes’ founded by Kolmogorov (1933). The for-
mer comprises all the probabilistic assumptions imposed on the data, and the
latter formalizes the notions of a ‘random series’ into a realizationn of an IID
stochastic proceses, as well as departures from it in the form of probabilistic
concepts for dependence and heterogeneity.
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Yule’s reverse engineering. Given that there was no notion of a pre-
specified parametric statistical model, comprising the probabilistic assumptions
imposed on the data, Yule resorted to ‘reverse engineering’:
“When we find that a theoretical formula applied to a particular case gives
results which common sense judges to be incorrect, it is generally as well to examine
the particular assumptions from which it was deduced, and see which of them are
inapplicable to the case in point.” (p. 4-5)
He went on to consider the formula for estimating the sample standard error
and elicit the implicit probabilistic assumptions that render it a ‘good’ estimator
of the distribution standard error. Let us emulate Yule’s reverse engineering
using the sample correlation coefficient, which is the focus of his paper:
̂Corr(Xt, Yt)=
1
n
∑n
t=1(Yt − Y )(Xt −X)√
[ 1
n
∑
n
t=1
(Xt−X)2][ 1n
∑
n
t=1
(Yt−Y )2]
,
X= 1
n
∑n
t=1Xt, Y=
1
n
∑n
t=1 Yt,
̂V ar(Xt)=
1
n
∑n
t=1(Xt −X)2,
̂V ar(Yt)=
1
n
∑n
t=1(Yt−Y )2, ̂Cov(Xt, Yt)= 1n
∑n
t=1(Yt−Y )(Xt−X),
(7)
as a ‘good’ estimator of the distribution correlation coefficient:
Corr(Xt, Yt)=
Cov(Xt,Yt)√
V ar(Xt)V ar(Yt)
The first assumption implicit in these formulae is the constancy of the moments:
E(Yt)=µ1, E(Xt)=µ2, V ar(Yt)=σ11, V ar(Xt)=σ22, Cov(Xt, Yt)=σ12, t∈N,
which corresponds to a form of the ID assumption. The formulae for ̂V ar(Xt)
and ̂V ar(Yt), implicitly assume non-correlation over t∈N, otherwise they should
have included covariances over t∈N terms. Yule also sought to unveil the implicit
distributional assumption “in order to reduce the formula to the very simple form
given.” (p. 5) The sample moments are not always ‘optimal’ estimators of the
distribution moments. For instance, the estimators in (7) will be ‘optimal’
under Normality, but they will be non-optimal if the distribution is Uniform;
see Carlton (1946).
In light of the fact that under Normality the assumption of ID reduces to the
constancy of the first two moments, and non-correlation coincides with Inde-
pendence, one could make a case that the implicit parametric statistical model
underlying the above formulae is the simple bivariate Normal in table 2.
Table 2 - The simple (bivariate) Normal model
Statistical GM: Zt = µ+ ut,
[1] Normal: Zt ∽ N(., .),
[2] Constant mean: E(Zt)=µ,
[3] Constant covariance: V ar(Zt)=Σ,
[4] Independence: {Zt, t∈N} is independent.


t∈N,
Zt:=
(
yt
Xt
)
, µ:=
(
µ1
µ2
)
, Σ:=
(
σ11 σ12
σ12 σ22
)
(8)
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When any of the assumptions [1]-[4] are invalid for the particular data Z0,
the estimated correlation coefficient is likely to be ‘spurious’ (statistically un-
trustworthy). Granted, certain departures from particular assumptions, such as
[2]-[4], are more serious than other departures, say from [1]. A glance at the
t-plots of Yule’s (1926) data suggests, to borrow his phrase on p. 5, that:
“Neither series, obviously, in the least resembles a random series” (aka IID).
Fig. 1: t-plot of xt-ratio of Church of
England marriages to all marriages
Fig. 2: t-plot of yt-the mortality rate
for the period 1866-1911
Both data series exhibit clear departures from IID (fig. 6) in the form of mean
t-heterogeneity (trending mean) and dependence (irregular cycles). To bring out
the cycles in the original data more clearly one needs to subtract the trending
means using, say, a generic 3rd degree trend polynomial.
Fig. 3: t-plot of detrended xt Fig. 4: t-plot of detrended yt
In light of the direct relationship between the correlation (ρ12) and the re-
gression coefficient (β1) in (6), one can pose the question of statistical adequacy
in the context of the Linear Regression model, which will yield:
yt=−10.847
(1.416)
+ .419
(.020)
xt + ût, R
2=.905, s=.664, n=46, (9)
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where the standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficient esti-
mates. Both coefficients (β0, β1) seem statistically significant since the t-ratios
are: τ0(z0)=
10.847
1.416 =7.660[.000], τ1(z0)=
.419
.020=20.95[.000],
and the p-values are given in square brackets. Note that the implied correlation
(see (7)) yields the value in Yule (1926): ρ̂xy=.419(
4.854
2.137 )=.952[.000].
A glance at the t-plot of the residuals (fig. 5), however, indicates that (9)
is statistically misspecified; assumptions [4]-[5] are likely to be invalid. The
residual t-plot differs from that of a NIID realization (fig. 6) in so far as it ex-
hibits distinct trends and cycles. These misspecifications are confirmed formally
by the statistical significance of the trends and lags in the auxiliary regression
based on the residuals (ût) from (9):
ût=11.987
(1.267)
− .413
(.016)
xt−1.670
(.998)
t− .406
(.216)
t2+ .885
(.076)
yt−1+ .006
(.015)
xt−1 (10)
Fig. 5: t-plot of the residuals from (9) Fig. 6: t-plot of NIID data
These results suggest that the estimator of β1 is inconsistent, and the t-test
for its significance is statistically untrustworthy. Taking mean deviations from
(x, y) when the actual means are trending, will render all the above estimators
in (7) inconsistent.
In light of these departures from the IID assumptions, (7) is an inconsistent
estimator of the correlation coefficient, and thus statistically spurious. Indeed,
one can easily show that when the data are de-trended and de-memorized (sub-
tract the temporal dependence using 2 lags) to render (7) an appropriate esti-
mator, the estimated correlation is: ρ̂xy=.003[.985], which is totally statistically
insignificant.
In summary, the notion of statistical adequacy provides a direct and testable
link between statistical misspecification and statistically untrustworthy (spuri-
ous) associations, or inference results more generally. A likely criticism of this
link is that the probability assumptions of the assumed model in (8) are too
strong, in contrast to the current statistical practice favoring as weak a set of
assumptions as possible. The short reply to such a charge is that weaker but
non-testable assumptions (i) do not render the assumed model less vulnera-
ble to statistical misspecifications, and (ii) they underestimate the importance
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of securing statistical adequacy. In addition, weak assumptions often rely on
asymptotic sampling distributions without testing the validity of the assump-
tions invoked by limit theorems; see Spanos (2015). The truth of the matter is
that the trustworthiness of all inference results will rely exclusively on the ap-
proximate validity of the probabilistic assumptions imposed on Z0, and nothing
else. As argued by Le Cam (1986, p. xiv): “... limit theorems ”as n tends to
infinity” are logically devoid of content about what happens at any particular n.
3.4 Example 3. The third variable reversion
In this sub-section we consider an empirical example based on cross-section data
because statistical adequacy is less well appreciated in such a context.
Consider the case where a practitioner wants to evaluate the effect of edu-
cation on a person’s income. The data refer to education, xt-years of schooling,
and income, yt-thousands of dollars, for n=100 working people within the age
group of 30-40 years old selected from a city’s population. The estimated LR
model yields:
yt=53.694
(1.957)
− .474
(.147)
xt + ût, R
2=.096, s=3.307, n=100. (11)
Both coefficients (β0, β1) appear to be statistically significant since the t-ratios
are:
τ0(z0)=
53.694
1.957 =27.437[.0000], τ1(z0)=
.474
.147=3.224[.001].
The practitioner is surprised by the negative sign of the coefficient of xt, since
that implies that additional years of education contribute negatively to one’s
income. He takes a closer look at the data and decides to run separate linear
regressions for men (n1=50) and women (n2=50).
The estimated LR model for men yields:
y1t=45.229
(2.236)
+ .409
(.172)
x1t + û1t, R
2=.973, s=2.371, n1=50. (12)
The estimated LR model for women yields:
y2t=35.106
(2.937)
+ .675
(.199)
x2t + û2t, R
2=.193, s=2.124, n2=50. (13)
The estimation results in (12)-(13) indicate that for both estimated regres-
sions:
– the coefficients (β0, β1) are statistically significant, and
– the sign of the coefficient β1, of education variable (xt), is positive.
The positive sign of the estimated β1 clearly contradicts the negative sign
in (11), which is usually interpreted as a case where a statistical association is
reversed. This is considered as an example of Simpson’s paradox when viewed
from perspective (b), where gender (Dt) is viewed as a confounding variable
that correlates with both yt-income and xt-education. In econometrics, this is
usually viewed as a case of ‘omitted-variable bias’; see Greene (2011). According
to Pearl (2014), p. 10, the only way to decide whether to rely on the aggregated
data regression in (11) or the disaggregated data regressions (12)-(13) is to use
causal calculus.
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Fig. 7: Residuals from equation (11)
Upon reflection, however, the statistical misspecification perspective pro-
vides an alternative way to resolve the paradox on statistical adequacy grounds.
The above estimation and testing results in (11)-(13) are trustworthy only when
the model assumptions [1]-[5] are valid for the particular data for each of the
three estimated equations. Estimating the aggregated data equation (11) using
‘gender’ as the ordering of interest, and plotting the residuals (fig. 7) suggests
that (11) is statistically misspecified because the t-plot is far from being Normal
white-noise. Assumption [5] is clearly invalid since its sample mean is not con-
stant around zero, but shifts from positive for the first half to negative for the
second, and the variance appears smaller for the second half; see Spanos (1999),
ch. 5. This form of t-heterogeneity differs from that in Yule’s data discussed
above.
This is confirmed by the auxiliary regression using the residuals (ût):
ût=−15.986
(2.00)
+ .967
(.134)
xt + 6.556
(.616)
Dt, R
2=.54, s=2.263, n=100,
where Dt:=(1, 1, ..., 1, 0, 0..., 0), 1-male, 0-female, since its coefficient is statisti-
cally significant: τ3(z0)=
6.556
.616 =10.643[.0000].
This suggests that the statistical misspecification perspective provides a very
different interpretation of the reversion results and offers an alternative way to
resolve the apparent paradox.
First, the key to resolving any seemingly conflicting inference results is not
the notion of ‘confounding’ (Pearl, 2014), but that of statistical adequacy. Be-
fore one can talk about any form of reversal of a statistical association, one
needs to establish that all the associations involved are statistically trustwor-
thy. Any claim that there is a ‘reversal of association’ between equation (11) and
(12)-(13) is misleading since the aggregated data equation (11) is statistically
misspecified. Therefore, the inference that the coefficient of xt is negative and
statistically significant is untrustworthy; an artifact of imposing invalid prob-
abilistic assumptions on data z0. Hence, the aggregate data misrepresent the
relationship between yt and xt.
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Fig. 8: t-plot of income (yt) Fig. 9: t-plot of education (xt)
Second, the diagnosis that the variable ‘gender’, represented by Dt is a
missing ‘confounder’ seems rather misleading for two reasons. The information
pertaining to the ordering(s) of potential interest is already in the original data
z0 (see figures 8-9). In addition, defining the confounder as an omitted variable
Z which is related to the included variables X and Y in the right way, requires
that Z is stochastic variable, not a deterministic ordering. For statistical infer-
ence purposes, the inclusion of generic terms such as shifts in the mean, trends
and lags in the estimated equation could, in certain cases, secure statistical
adequacy, without having to resort to finding additional explanatory variables.
In the case of (11), a more pertinent explanation is that the modeler ne-
glected, or chose to ignore, the heterogeneity in the data by assuming constant
mean and variance (ID) for both data series with respect to the ordering, gen-
der. Such forms of misspecification pertain to statistical information contained
in the data, which could be generically modeled using shift functions or/and
trend polynomials in t or/and lags, respectively; see Spanos (1999).
In the case of example 3, one could attempt to respecify the original equation
in (11) by including the dummy variable (Dt):
yt= 37.639+
(2.00)
6.556
(.616)
Dt + .501
(.134)
xt + ût, R
2=.58, s=2.272, n=100. (14)
As it stands, the coefficient of xt represents an misleading weighted average of
the two coefficients from the disaggregated data in (12)-(13). The residuals from
this equation (fig. 10) do not indicate any major departures from assumptions
[1]-[5], but in practice one needs to apply thorough misspecification testing to
confirm or deny such a claim. For instance, one needs to test that the variances
of the residuals in the two sub-samples are equal; see Spanos (1986), p. 481-3.
Finally and most importantly, using the statistical misspecification perspec-
tive, one can distinguish clearly between example 1 (section 2), and examples
2 and 3 above. The key difference is that in example 1 both LR models (1)
and (5) are statistically adequate. In contrast, in example 3 the estimated LR
model (11) based on aggregated data, is statistically misspecified which renders
the estimated coefficients and t-tests statistically untrustworthy. Hence, there
was never a statistically trustworthy result at the aggregate level that gave rise
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to a reversal of associations. In example 3, only the disaggregated data give rise
to statistically reliable inferences. This calls seriously into question the conven-
tional wisdom that these two cases as identical, as stated by Samuels (1993), p.
87:
“Simpson’s paradox is actually no more paradoxical than the reversal or distortion
of association in other settings, no more, for instance, than the familiar fact that
a partial regression coefficient can have a different sign from a simple regression
coefficient.”
Fig. 10: Residuals from equation (14)
In concluding this section, it is important to emphasize that the statistical
misspecification perspective requires one to know the complete set of proba-
bilistic assumptions imposed on the data, i.e. the statistical model. More often
than not, practitioners have an incomplete picture of the statistical model, they
rarely test its assumptions, and thus the ensuing inference results are often un-
trustworthy. Hence, in evaluating published empirical papers, it is sometimes
useful to employ Yule’s reverse engineering to uncover the statistical model.
4 Misspecified Bernoulli models
In this section we will revisit two cross-section data sets that have been widely
discussed in the statistics literature, using the statistical misspecification per-
spective.
4.1 Example 4. The UC Berkeley admissions data
Bickel et al. (1975) published an influential paper in Science, where they il-
lustrated Simpson’s paradox using cross-section data based on UC Berkeley
admissions, for the Fall of 1973. Their perspective relates to perspective (a)
and pertains to the reversal of a statistical relationship between the aggregated
data, at the university level, and the disaggregated data, at the department
level. The aggregate data are shown in table 3 and the data for the largest 5
departments, denoted by A-F, are given in table 4;
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simpson%27s paradox.
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The estimated parameter θ=P(X=1) based on the aggregate data (table 3)
indicates that the rate of admissions for female candidates ( θ̂F=.35) is smaller
that for male candidates (θ̂M=.44), and a test for the difference indicated a
statistically significant difference; see Bickel et al. (1975). At the department
level, however, the admissions rate for females is greater than that of males
in five out of the six departments shown in table 4. This is interpreted as an
apparent reversal of the inference based on the aggregate data. The statistical
misspecification perspective, however, suggests that the estimated admissions
rate using the aggregated data is statistically untrustworthy. Let us unpack
this claim.
Table 3: Admissions Aggregate Data
Males Females total
Admit 3738 1494 5232
Deny 4704 2827 7531
Total 8442 4321 12763
θ̂M=
3738
8442=.44, θ̂F=
1494
4321=.35
Table 4: Admissions disaggregated data for departments A-F
A Males Females total
Admit 512 89 601
Deny 313 19 332
Total 825 108 933
θ̂AM=
512
825=.62, θ̂AF=
89
108=.82
B Males Females total
Admit 353 17 370
Deny 207 8 215
Total 560 25 585
θ̂BM=
353
560=.63, θ̂BF=
17
25=.68
C Males Females total
Admit 120 202 322
Deny 205 391 596
Total 325 593 918
θ̂CM=
120
325=.37, θ̂CF=
202
593=.34
D Males Females total
Admit 139 131 270
Deny 278 244 522
Total 417 375 792
θ̂DM=
139
417=.33, θ̂DF=
131
375=.35
E Males Females total
Admit 53 94 147
Deny 138 199 337
Total 191 293 484
θ̂EM=
53
191=.28, θ̂EF=
94
293=.32
F Males Females total
Admit 22 23 45
Deny 351 318 669
Total 373 341 714
θ̂FM=
22
373=.06, θ̂FF=
23
341=.07
What is missing from the discussion of the traditional association reversal
interpretation is any evidence that the above inferences based on the estimated
θ is trustworthy. Such evidence can be secured by testing the validity of the
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assumptions invoked by the above inferences, which comprise the underlying
statistical model: a bivariate version of the simple Bernoulli model (table 5),
with θ replaced with a vector of unknown parameters θ:=(θ00, θ01, θ10, θ11); see
Bishop et al. (1975).
In relation to the Bernoulli model, it is important to point out that θ is also
the mean of process underlying the data, as well as determining the variance,
i.e.
E(Xt)=θ, V ar(Xt)=θ(1−θ), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, ∀t∈N.
Table 5 - The simple Bernoulli model
Statistical GM: Xt = θ + ut,
[1] Bernoulli: Xt ∽ Ber(., .),
[2] Constant mean: E(Xt)=θ,
[3] Constant variance: V ar(Xt)=θ(1− θ),
[4] Independence: {Xt, t∈N} is independent.


t∈N
A glance at the estimated θ for males and females at the department level
in table 4, indicate clearly that the estimated means and variances differ, not
only from those based on aggregate data, but also between departments. This
renders assumptions [2] and [3] invalid at the aggregate level. That is, when the
data are aggregated the process {Xt, t∈N} is no longer Identically Distributed
(ID) with respect to the ordering ‘gender’.
In light of this, the association reversal is spurious because the estimated
values:
θ̂M=
3738
8442=.44, θ̂F=
1494
4321=.35
from the aggregated data. This is because the estimators of θ using the aggre-
gated data will be inconsistent estimators of the true θ.
Fig. 11: t-plot of Xt ∽BerIID(.2, .16) Fig. 12: t-plot of Zt ∽BerIID(.6, .24)
To see how this arises in practice, consider figures 11-12 that represent the
t-plots of two Bernoulli IID [BerIID(E(Xt), V ar(Xt))] processes with θ=.2 and
θ=.6, respectively.
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As can be seen from these figures, the concentration of longer ‘runs’ [group
of successive values of 0’s or 1’s] switches from the value 0 to the value 1 as
θ increases above .5. Hence, any attempt to ignore the differences in the two
moments of such processes will give rise to a misspecified Bernoulli model. That
invalidates any inferences based on the aggregate data, and the only potentially
reliable inference can be drawn from the disaggregated data.
4.2 Example 5. The Lindley and Novick (1981) data
The above statistical misspecification perspective can be used to explain the
seemingly contradictory results in Lindley and Novick’s (1981) hypothetical data
shown below. This is a particularly interesting example because, as argued by
Armistead (2014), the ordering of interest might become apparent after the
data are collected. For instance, in a clinical trial the ‘gender’ or/and ‘age’
ordering(s) might turn out to be relevant after the data are collected.
The estimated θ’s for the aggregated data in table 6:
θ̂W=
20
40=.5, θ̂B=
16
40=.4,
are very different from those based on the disaggregated data (table 7), render-
ing the former statistically untrustworthy because it imposes an invalid assump-
tion: the means of the Bernoulli process underlying the disaggregated data are
constant.
Table 6: Lindley-Novick
Aggregated Data
White Black total
High 20 16 36
Low 20 24 44
Total 40 40 80
θ̂W=
20
40=.5, θ̂B=
16
40=.4
Table 7: Lindley-Novick disaggregated data
Short White Black total
High 2 9 11
Low 8 21 29
Total 10 30 40
θ̂SW=
2
10=.2, θ̂SB=
9
30=.3
Tall White Black total
High 18 7 25
Low 12 3 15
Total 30 10 40
θ̂TW=
18
30=.6, θ̂TB=
7
10=.7
5 Revisiting the causal modeling ‘solution’
Pearl’s (2014) claims that the only way to resolve the paradox is to use causal
calculus:
“I am not aware of another condition that rules out effect reversal with com-
parable assertiveness and generality, requiring only that Z not be affected by our
action, a requirement satisfied by all treatment-independent covariates Z. Thus, it
is hard, if not impossible, to explain the surprise part of Simpson’s reversal with-
out postulating that human intuition is governed by causal calculus together with
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a persistent tendency to attribute causal interpretation to statistical associations.”
(p. 10)
Viewing examples 2-5 from the misspecification perspective, however, lends
support to the Armistead’s (2014) key argument:
“Whether causal or not, third variables can convey critical information about
a first-order relationship, study design, and previously unobserved variables. Any
conditioning on a nontrivial third variable that produces Simpson’s Paradox should
be carefully examined before either the aggregated or the disaggregated findings
are accepted, regardless of whether the third variable is thought to be causal. In
some cases, neither set of data is trustworthy; in others, both convey information
of value.” (p. 1)
Indeed, in cases where the ‘third variable’ represents an ordering of poten-
tial interest for the particular data, the only relevant criterion to decide which
orderings are relevant for the statistical analysis of the particular data is the
statistical adequacy of the estimated equations. That is, when two or more al-
ternative orderings are potentially relevant for a particular data set, one needs
to test the statistical adequacy of all three equations relative to each of these
orderings before one could draw reliable conclusions concerning how to resolve
any apparently paradoxical results. Where does this leave the Pearl (2014) claim
quoted above?
5.1 Statistical vs. substantive adequacy
Cartwright (1979) rightly points out that reliance on regularities and frequencies
for statistical inference purposes is not sufficient for representing substantively
meaningful causal relations. On the other hand, imposing causal relations that
belie the chance regularities in the data would only give rise to untrustworthy
inference results. While the causal dimension remains an important component
in delineating the issues raised by Simpson’s paradox, it is not the only relevant,
or even the most important, dimension in unraveling the puzzle. Indeed, the
suggestion that in cases where the third variable (ordering of interest) is non-
causal one should accept the results based on the aggregated data (Pearl, 2009),
is called into question by examples 2-5. This is because when the model esti-
mated using the aggregated data is statistically misspecified, the causal inference
results pertaining to conditional independence are likely to be untrustworthy.
One way or another, the modeler needs to account for the statistical information
not accounted for by the original statistical model, with a view to ensure the
trustworthiness of the ensuring statistical results.
It is interesting to note that Yule (1926) considered the third variable causal
explanation, but questioned its value as a general ‘solution’ to the problem:
“Now it has been said that to interpret such correlations as implying causation is
to ignore the common influence of the time-factor. While there is a sense – a special
and definite sense – in which this may perhaps be said to cover the explanation, as
will appear in the sequel, to my own mind the phrase has never been intellectually
satisfying.” (p. 4)
A crucial issue that needs to be addressed by the causal explanation is that
conditioning on a third variable is not as straightforward as adherents to this
18
‘explanation’ of Simpson’s paradox would have us believe. In practice, the
question whether a particular variable Zt constitutes a confounder is not just
a matter of testing whether Zt relates to Yt and Xt the right way; see Pearl
(2009), Spirtes et al. (2000). Before such testing can even begin, one needs
to test for the statistical adequacy of the estimated model with respect to a
relevant ordering. Although ‘time’ is the obvious ordering for time series, it
is no different than other deterministic orderings for cross-section data such as
‘gender’, marital status, age, geographical position, etc.; only the scale of mea-
surement differs. When the original model is statistically misspecified, it needs
to be respecified with a view to secure statistical adequacy. Often one can
restore statistical adequacy using generic terms relating to that ordering. To
secure substantive adequacy, however, one needs to replace such generic terms
with proper explanatory random variables without foregoing the statistical ad-
equacy. The latter ensures the reliability of testing whether Zt is a confounder
or not; see Spanos (2006b).
Yule (1926) considered ‘time’ as a third variable and expressed his misgiv-
ings:
“I cannot regard time per se as a causal factor; and the words only suggest that
there is some third quantity varying with the time to which the changes in both the
observed variables are due.” (p. 4)
Viewing his comment from the vantage point of today’s probabilistic per-
spective, the proposal to ‘condition’ on a third variable raises technical issues,
since the conditional distribution, defined by:
f(yt|xt, dt;ϕ)= f(yt,xt,dt;ψ)f(dt;φ) , ∀yt∈RY ,
makes no probabilistic sense when dt is a determinist ordering (variable) such
as time; see Williams (1991). This issue arises more clearly in cases where the
ordering was deemed potentially important after the data have been collected,
such as having plants grow short or tall, blood pressure being high or low,
black or white plants, etc.; see Armistead (2014). How does one bridge the gap
between a deterministic ordering of interest and conditioning on a third random
variable related to that ordering?
Separating modeling from inference. The statistical misspecification
perspective suggests that to ensure the reliability of inference one needs to sep-
arate the initial stages of specification (initial model selection) misspecification
testing and respecification, from inference proper. The latter includes testing
for substantive adequacy, such as attributing causality to statistical associations.
In practice, this requires focusing first on the ordering(s) of interest that could
potentially reveal statistical misspecifications that pertain to dependence and
heterogeneity uncovered by misspecification testing. The next step is to re-
specify the initial model with a view to account for the statistical information
revealed by the misspecification testing. This is usually achieved by employing
generic terms, such as shifts, trends and lags, to ‘capture’ such forms of system-
atic statistical information. Once statistical adequacy is secured one can then
proceed to ‘model’ such information by replacing the generic terms with appro-
priate explanatory variables with a view to improve the substantive adequacy
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without forgoing the statistical adequacy. This is because a third degree trend
polynomial might capture the mean heterogeneity in the data to ensure the sta-
tistical reliability of inference, but from the substantive perspective it represents
ignorance. Replacing the trend polynomial with explanatory variables without
forsaking statistical adequacy will add to our understanding of the phenomenon
of interest; see Spanos (2010).
Viewing the problem from a broader perspective, the primary reason for the
untrustworthiness is that the question of probing for the nature of any causal
connections pertains to substantive, and not statistical adequacy, even though
the distinction between the two might not always be clear cut or obvious; see
Spanos (2010). This distinction is crucial because any attempt to probe for
substantive adequacy, including causal connections, before securing statistical
adequacy of the assumed statistical model is likely to give rise to unreliable re-
sults. To avoid this problem of unreliable inferences, one needs to establish the
statistical adequacy of the original model first before probing for any form of
substantive adequacy, such as attributing a causal interpretation to statistical
associations. These include probing for the appropriateness of a particular con-
founder or choosing between different potential confounders; see Spanos (2006b)
for an extensive discussion.
This distinction is crucial in differentiating between statistically and substan-
tively ‘spurious’ inferential results. Unfortunately, in the statistics and philoso-
phy of science literatures the term ‘spurious’ is often used to describe the latter;
see Blyth (1972). What is often insufficiently appreciated is that one needs
to establish first that there is a statistically trustworthy statistical association,
before attempting to explain it away as substantively spurious.
The statistical misspecification perspective also calls into question certain
philosophical discussions of Simpson’s paradox that focus primarily on the ‘num-
bers’ associated with the relevant probabilities/associations as in the case of
example 1. A typical representation of Simpson’s paradox in terms of events
A,B,C is:
P (A|B)<P (A|¬B), but
P (A|B,C)>P (A|¬B,C) and
P (A|B,¬C)>P (A|¬B,¬C),
(15)
where ‘¬’ denotes the ‘negation’ operator. Malinas and Bigelow (2016) illustrate
(15) using made up numbers that satisfy the above inequalities, and describe
the source of the paradox as follows:
“The applications arise from the close connections between proportions, per-
centages, probabilities, and their representations as fractions.” (p. 1)
They proceed to claim that their artificial illustration provides a way to explain
an empirical example from Cohen and Nagel (1934) concerning death rates in
1910 from tuberculosis in Richmond, Virginia and New York city. As argued
above, however, in the case of observed data some of the ‘numbers’ used in
such arguments might be statistically untrustworthy, undermining the soundness
of the logical argument in (15). Indeed, oversimplifications of the form (15),
contribute to the perpetuation of the misconceptions beleaguering the paradox.
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6 Summary and conclusions
What is often insufficiently appreciated in statistical modeling and inference is
that the inference propositions (optimal estimators, tests, and predictors and
their sampling distributions) depend crucially on the validity of the probabilistic
assumptions one imposes on the data. The totality of these assumptions com-
prise the underlying statistical model, which is used to define the distribution of
the sample and the likelihood function. If the statistical model is misspecified,
in the sense that any of its assumptions are invalid for the particular data, the
reliability of inference based on such a model is usually undermined, giving rise
to untrustworthy evidence.
The paper revisited Simpson’s paradox using the statistical misspecification
perspective with a view to shed light on several silent features of the paradox.
Using this perspective, it was argued that the key to unraveling the various
counterintuitive results associated with this paradox is to formalize the vague
notion of ‘spurious’ inference results into ‘statistically untrustworthy’ results
which can be evidenced using misspecification testing. This enables one to dis-
tinguish between two different cases of the paradox as it relates to the reversal
of statistical associations. Case 1, where the reversal is statistically trustworthy
because the underlying statistical models are statistically adequate (example
1). Case 2, where the apparent reversal is statistically untrustworthy due to
statistical misspecification (examples 2-5). The real issue is whether the infer-
ence results pertaining to statistical associations are statistically trustworthy or
not, and the key criterion to appraise that is statistical adequacy. Hence, the
statistical misspecification perspective puzzles out Simpson’s paradox because
in both cases there is nothing counterintuitive to explain.
The statistical misspecification perspective is also used to revisit the causal
dimension of the paradox by distinguishing between statistical and substantive
inadequacy (spuriousness). To ensure the reliability of any inferences relat-
ing to testing whether a third variable constitutes a confounder, requires that
the underlying statistical model is statistically adequate. This is particularly
problematic for the causal resolution of the paradox when the third variable is
related to a relevant ordering of interest which is revealed after the data are
collected. In such cases one needs to account for any departures from the model
assumptions as they relate to the ordering in question, and replace the generic
terms used to capture the neglected statistical information with substantively
meaningful explanatory variables.
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7 Appendix: The Linear Regression - implicit
statistical parameterizations
The traditional specification of the LR model takes the form:
yt=β0 + β
⊤
1 xt+ut,
[i] E(ut|Xt=xt)=0, [ii] E(u2t |Xt=xt)=σ2,
[iii] E(utus|Xt=xt)=0, [iv] ut∽N(., .), t∈N.
Theorem 1 Assumptions [i]-[iii] relating to the first two moments of the con-
ditional distribution f(ut|xt; θ), imply that the model parameters θ:=(β0, β1, σ2)
have the following statistical parameterizations in terms of the primary parame-
ters of the joint distribution f(yt,xt;φ), φ:=(E(yt), E(Xt), Cov(Xt), Cov(Xt, yt)):
β0=E(yt)−β⊤1 E(Xt), β1=[Cov(Xt)]−1Cov(Xt, yt),
σ2=V ar(yt)−Cov(Xt, yt)⊤[Cov(Xt)]−1Cov(Xt, yt)
(16)
Proof. Assumption [i] implies that:
E(ut|Xt=xt)=0⇔ E(yt|Xt=xt)=β0 + β⊤1 xt. (17)
The law of iterated expectations (Williams, 1991): (E [E(Y |σ(X))])=E(Y ),
where σ(X) denotes the sigma-field generated by X, implies that:
E [E(yt|σ(Xt))] =E(yt)=β0+β⊤1 E(Xt) =⇒ β0=E(yt)− β⊤1 E(Xt)
Substituting β0 back into yt=β0 + β
⊤
1 xt+ut yields:
[yt − E(yt)] =β⊤1 [Xt − E(Xt)] + ut.
Post-multiplying both sides by [Xt−E(Xt)]⊤ and taking expectations yields:
Cov(yt,Xt) :=E
(
[yt−E(yt)] [Xt−E(Xt)]⊤
)
=
=β⊤1 [Xt−E(Xt)] [Xt−E(Xt)]⊤+E(ut [Xt−E(Xt)]⊤).
Since, the last term is zero: E(X⊤t ut)=E [E(ut|σ(Xt))] =0,
it follows that: β1=[Cov(Xt)]
−1Cov(Xt, yt).
In the case of σ2 we use a theorem analogous to the lie for the variance
(Williams, 1991):
V ar(yt) = E [V ar(yt|σ(Xt))] + V ar [E(yt|σ(Xt))] ,
where, by definition E [V ar(yt|σ(Xt))] =σ2. The mean deviation of (17) is:[
β0+β
⊤
1 Xt
]− E ([β0+β⊤1 Xt])=β⊤1 [Xt − E(Xt)] ,
and thus, by definition:
V ar [E(yt|Xt)] =E
[
β⊤1 [Xt−E(Xt)] [Xt−E(Xt)]⊤ β1
]
=β⊤1 [Cov(Xt)]β1.
From this, it follows that:
V ar(yt)=σ
2+β⊤1 [Cov(Xt)]β1 =⇒ σ2=V ar(yt)−β⊤1 [Cov(Xt)]β1,
which yields the parameterization in (16).
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